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Statutes of Limitations. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A-2d 873
(R.I. 1996). The seven year limitation imposed by Rhode Island
General Laws section 9-1-51 for bringing claims for childhood sex-
ual abuse is applicable only to actions against defendant perpetra-
tors. A three year period under section 9-1-14(b) is applied to non-
perpetrator defendants. Section 9-1-51 does not apply retroac-
tively to claims already barred by a statute of limitations in effect
prior to July 26, 1993.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In response to litigation in both the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Supe-
rior Court regarding alleged sexual abuse of minors by Catholic
priests, these courts sent four certified questions to the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court for consideration.' These cases involved
abuse claims against priest-perpetrators, as well as negligence and
vicarious liability claims against non-perpetrator agents, including
various church employers of the perpetrators, among others.2 The
questions were as follows: 1) "whether claims for injuries resulting
from the sexual abuse of a minor are governed by G.L. 1956 § 9-1-
51 .. . or G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14(b) when those claims are asserted
against someone other than the alleged abuser;"3 2) "when does a
cause of action accrue against a nonperpetrator-defendant pursu-
ant to § 9-1-14(b);" 4 3) "whether repressed recollection of past sex-
ual abuse could qualify as a tolling feature encompassed within the
'unsound mind' factor in § 9-1-19;"5 and as a matter of first impres-
sion, 4) "whether, under both the Federal and the State Constitu-
tions, it is constitutionally permissible for our General Assembly to
revive a previously time-barred cause of action by application of
§ 9-1-51 to that cause of action."6 The supreme court accepted the
four certified questions.7
1. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A-2d 873, 874 (ILI. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 875.
4. Id. at 877.
5. Id. at 879.
6. Id. at 880.
7. Id. at 875-80.
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BACKGROUND
When it enacted chapter eighty-four of the 1992 Public Laws,
the Rhode Island General Assembly first recognized a special cause
of action for victims of childhood sexual abuse.8 When the Act was
first passed, the general civil action statute of limitations of three
years commencing when the injury occurred applied to these cases,
unless it was tolled under section 9-1-19. 9 The Act also included a
delayed discovery rule which permitted a plaintiff to bring an ac-
tion when he or she first discovered or reasonably should have dis-
covered the injury.10 Prior to the enactment of section 9-1-51, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had "reserved decision on whether to
permit utilization of a discovery rule in a sexual abuse... claim" so
as to expand the three year limitation period.". In 1993, the Gen-
eral Assembly enlarged the original limitation period, extending it
from three to seven years in cases of childhood sexual abuse.' 2 Lit-
igation arising under section 9-1-51 prompted questions for both
the federal and state trial courts as to the proper use and interpre-
tation of the statute of limitations, which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court answered in Kelly v. Marcantonio.13
ANALysis AD HOLDING
The first question addressed by the court was "whether claims
for injuries resulting from the sexual abuse of a minor are gov-
erned by G.L. 1956 § 9-1-5114 ... or G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14(b)' 5 when
8. Id. at 881 (citing 1992 ILI. Pub. Laws ch. 84).
9. RI. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (1985); i& § 9-1-19 (Supp. 1996).
10. ILI. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51(a) (Supp. 1996).
11. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 811 (citing Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A-2d 605 (R.I. 1991)).
In Kelly, the court noted that the Doe case may have served a small role in prompt-
ing the legislature to adopt a delayed discovery rule in the session following the
Doe decision. Id. at 881 n8.
12. 1993 Pub. Laws ch. 274 (amending MI. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51(a)).
13. 678 A.2d 873 (RI. 1996).
14. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51. This section reads in part as follows:
(a) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by
any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of child-
hood sexual abuse shall be commenced within seven (7) years of the act
alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or seven (7) years of the
time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the
injury or condition was caused by said act, whichever period expires later.
(b) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual
abuse or exploitation incidents causes the injury complained of, but may
compute the date of discovery from the date of the last act by the same
19971
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those claims are asserted against someone other than the alleged
abuser."16 Section 9-1-51 permits a claimant to bring an action
"for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood
sexual abuse" within seven years of the act which caused the
claimant's injury, or "seven (7) years of the time the victim discov-
ered or reasonably should have discovered ... that the injury or
condition was caused by said act."17 The court determined that the
"only intended target of [section 9-1-51]" was the perpetrator of the
criminal sexual act.18 It based its conclusion on a strict construc-
tionist reading of the legislative language in section 9-1-51, espe-
cially 9-1-51(e), and found further support in a California court's
interpretation of a similar statute in Debbie Reynolds Professional
Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court.19 In Reynolds, the statute
addressing the time permitted to bring a sexual abuse claim was
limited to claims made against the actual perpetrator.20 Addi-
tional support, the court noted, was demonstrated by the fact that
when section 9-1-51 was first enacted, it confined the statute of
limitations to the general three year time period permitted for civil
personal injury actions. 2 1 However, the legislature designated
that the "intended defendant" was the "perpetrator" for purposes of
computing the period of limitation for child sexual abuse victims.22
According the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,
perpetrator which is part of a common scheme of plan of sexual abuse or
exploitation.
(e) As used in this section, "childhood sexual abuse" means any act com-
mitted by the defendant against a complainant who was less than eight-
een (18) years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been
a criminal violation of chapter 37 of title 11.
Id.
15. Id. § 9-1-14(b) (1985) (providing that actions for personal injuries must be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues).
16. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 875.
17. Id. (quoting RI. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51(a) (Supp. 1996)).
18. Id. at 876.
19. 25 Cal. App. 4th 222 (1994) (The goal of the statute was to allow sexual
abuse victims more time to become aware of their psychological injuries and con-
tinue to be eligible to bring suit. The California statute did not explicitly exclude
actions against non-perpetrators, but the appellate court noted that the legislature
could easily have expressed their desire to include such defendants if they had so
intended).
20. Id. at 232-33.
21. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 877.
22. Id.
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the court found it both "clear and unambiguous" that section 9-1-
51 had no application to claims made against non-perpetrator de-
fendants, but rather that for those defendants, the three year stat-
ute of limitations provided in section 9-1-14(b) applied.23
After determining that section 9-1-51 did not apply to non-per-
petrator defendants, the court considered when a cause of action
would accrue against such defendants under section 9-1-14(b). 24
Because child sexual abuse "is essentially a common law battery,"
the statute of limitations generally starts running at the time the
injury occurs. 25 Following the reasoning of Reynolds, the court
found that since it was the perpetrator of the abuse who was re-
sponsible for instigating the memory repression defense mecha-
nism in the claimant, the delayed discovery rule should only be
applied to perpetrator defendants.26 The court perceived "no per-
suasive policy" reasons to support applying a delayed discovery
rule to non-perpetrator defendants, and noted that the running of
the three year limit in section 9-1-14(b) could be tolled pursuant to
section 9-1-19.27
The court found further support for its decision on this second
question in Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories,28 where it applied the
delayed discovery rule to drug-product liability actions.2 9 Weigh-
ing the "policy of eliminating the enforcement of stale claims with
the opportunity of a person to have his or her day in court," the
court found the equities coming down on the side of applying the
delayed discovery rule in product liability cases.30 Then-Justice
Weisberger dissented, warning that "'the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them.'"31 Finding no policy reason strong enough to support the
23. Id. (quoting Bottiglieri v. Caldarone, 486 A.2d 1085, 1087 (RI. 1985)).
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Silveira v. Santos, 490 A.2d 969, 973 (RLI. 1985)) (citing
Soares v. Ann & Hope, 637 A.2d 339 (ILI. 1994)).
26. Id. at 878 (citing Debbie Reynolds Profl Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Ct.,
25 Cal. App. 4th 222, 233 (1994)).
27. Id. Section 9-1-19 sets out the disabilities which postpone the running of a
statute of limitations, including being under "the age of eighteen (18) years, or of
unsound mind, or imprisoned, or beyond the limits of the United States." RI. Gen.
Laws § 9-1-19 (Supp. 1996).
28. 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985).
29. Kelly, 678 A-2d at 877 (citing Anthony, 490 A.2d at 43).
30. Id. at 878 (quoting Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46-47).
31. Id. (quoting Anthony, 490 A.2d at 49 (Weisberger, J., dissenting)).
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application of the delayed discovery rule to non-perpetrators, and
recognizing that "the General Assembly considered the right of the
nonperpetrator-defendant to be free of stale claims to be as great
as the right of a plaintiff to prosecute a childhood sexual abuse
claim," the court declined to upset the balance set by the legisla-
ture.3 2 Thus, the court answered the second certified question by
holding that "in actions against nonperpetrator defendants for
damages resulting from childhood sexual abuse, the period of limi-
tation, under § 9-1-14(b), commences to accrue at the time the in-
jury occurs, subject to the tolling provision of § 9-1-19."33
The third question required the court to answer "whether re-
pressed recollection of past sexual abuse could qualify as a tolling
feature encompassed within the 'unsound mind' factor in section 9-
1-19."34 While suggesting that it would answer this affirmatively,
the court noted that it "was not the proper forum" to make this
determination, and chose to leave the final question for the trial
courts.35 The court noted that in a particular case, trial judges
would hold hearings to consider expert medical and scientific evi-
dence to determine whether the "alleged repressed recollection in a
particular case is sufficiently relevant, reliable, and scientifically
and/or medically established so as to constitute 'unsound mind,'
thereby tolling the action limitation period."36 The standard set
for the trial judges in examining expert testimony is set forth in
State v. Wheeler,3 7 which requires the trial court to determine
whether the evidence is relevant, whether the expert, is qualified
on the subject matter, and whether the expert opinion is of sub-
stantial probative value.38 If the trial court decides that evidence
of an unsound mind exists, the claim arising out of "the childhood
sexual abuse would not be ... time-barred ... until three years
after the unsound mind disability ends, and the repressed recollec-
tions are recovered."39
32. Id.
33. Id. at 879.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. A finding of "unsound mind" is similar to a finding of insanity, which is
also determined by the trial courts. Id. at 879 n.6.
37. 496 A.2d 1382 (RI. 1985).
38. Id. at 1388.
39. Kelly, 678 A-2d at 880.
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Finally, the court turned to the fourth question, "under both
the Federal and the State Constitutions, is it constitutionally per-
missible for our General Assembly to revive a previously time-
barred cause of action by application of section 9-1-51 to that cause
of action."40 The court answered this issue of first impression in
the negative, holding that while the General Assembly may "en-
large an already existing action limitation period that would be ap-
plicable to causes of action thereunder not already time-barred," it
was precluded by the Rhode Island Constitution from reviving an
"already time-barred action that would impinge on a defendant's
vested and substantive rights."41
In 1986, the Rhode Island Constitution was amended to in-
clude a civil due process clause.42 Prior to this amendment, the
revival of time-barred claims through retroactive application of
statutes of limitation were not constitutionally prohibited.43 Deci-
sions made prior to this time relied upon a general federal rule
stated in William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island Railroad
Co.,44 that "general statutes of limitation that are procedural in
nature affect only remedies, and not rights, and as a result there
would be no per se due process violation caused by enactment of a
statute reviving an already time-barred claim.. 45
However, in Twomey v. Carlton House,46 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, in dicta, expressed its desire to protect a defend-
ant's right to immunity from prosecution, because that right "is as
valuable a right to one party as the right to prosecute that suit is to
the other ... the opportunity to defend on statute of limitations
grounds is a vested right protected by due process concepts." 47
Once the Rhode Island Constitution was amended to add a civil
40. Id. (noting that this question pertained only to perpetrator defendants, as
the scope of section 9-1-51 was limited to that class of defendants).
41. Id. at 883 (citing Twomey v. Carlton House, 320 A.2d 98 (R.I. 1974)).
42. R.I. Const. art. I, § 2 (amended 1986).
43. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 882 (citing Dandeneau v. Board of Governors for Higher
Educ., 491 A.2d 1011 (R-I. 1985); Spagnoulo v. Bisceglio, 473 A.2d 285 (MI. 1984);
Twomey, 320 A.2d at 98).
44. 268 U.S. 633 (1925).
45. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 882 (citing Danzer, 268 U.S. at 633; Campbell v. Holt,
115 U.S. 620 (1885); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945)). The
court noted that most state courts do not follow the general federal rule set out in
these cases. Id. at 883.
46. 320 A.2d 98 (R.I. 1974).
47. Id. at 101 (quoting Campbell, 115 U.S. at 620 (Bradley, J., dissenting)).
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due process clause in 1986, the court was free to follow its inclina-
tion as expressed in Twomey, and did so here, by precluding legis-
lation with retroactive features from permitting the revival of an
already time-barred action. Such revival was held to impinge upon
a defendant's vested and substantive rights to immunity from
prosecution, and would offend a defendant's state constitutional
due process protections.48
CONCLUSION
The court has clearly established that Rhode Island General
Laws section 9-1-51 regarding the limitation period on childhood
sexual abuse actions applies only to claims against perpetrator de-
fendants, while actions against non-perpetrator defendants are
properly within the time limits set by section 9-1-14(b). It is within
the trial court's purview to determine whether the statute of limi-
tations period can be tolled due to the inability of a claimant to
recall incidents of sexual abuse. Finally, section 9-1-51 cannot be
retroactively applied to claims which are barred by a statute of
limitations already in effect prior to the effective date of that
provision. 49
Deborah M. Kupa
48. Kelly, 678 A-2d at 883.
49. The effective date of section 9-1-51 was July 26, 1993.
